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Abstract
This paper outlines the semiotic perspectives of Saussure and Peirce and the points at which these quite
different theories intersect. It considers the implications of these points of intersection for literary studies
and uses the example of Oedipus Rex to illustrate the semiotic character of acts and facts.
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Culler: Semiotic Consequences

SEMIOTIC CONSEQUENCES
JONATHAN CULLER
Cornell University

If one is interested in the consequences of semiotics for the
study of literary signification, one needs a reliable account of what
semiotics is or says; and for that it may be important to reflect on
the strange consequentiality of semiotics itself, for semiotics is not
a continuous discipline with a progressive historical evolution.'
Thinkers have often produced major insights about signs and
signification, but semiotics is not the sum of insights about the
sign. It comes into being when the problem of the sign is brought to
the fore, made to organize a field-a consequential intellectual
development.
One consequence of the advent of semiotics is the creation of
precursors and thus of a history. The history of semiotics involves
not an ordinary causal sequence but that special historical relationship which Freud calls Nachtraglichkeit, whereby an experience not
understood at the time it took place (such as witnessing a Primal
Scene) is later invested with traumatic meaning and, as trauma, can
then be treated as a cause of later events.' Semiotics now identifies,
as the trauma which determined its character, the activities in the
early years of this century of a strange couple, Ferdinand de
Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce.
They are an ill-sorted couple. Saussure was a successful and
respectable Swiss professor who had doubts about the foundations
of linguistics as then practiced and therefore wrote practically
nothing; but he did argue, in lectures that have come down to us
through students' notes, that since language was a system of signs,
linguistics ought to be part of a larger science of signs, «a science
which would study the life of signs within society. We call it
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semiology from the Greek semeion. It would teach us what signs
consist of, what laws govern them. Since it does not yet exist we
cannot say what it will be, but it has a right to existence; its place is
ensured in advance.»
These suggestions were not taken up, and only later, when
various disciplines had taken structural linguistics as a
methodological model and become versions of structuralism, did it
become evident that the semiology Saussure postulated had begun
to develop. At this point he became a powerful influence, partly
because he had written little and because the program outlined for
semiotics seemed easy to grasp: linguistics was to serve as example
and its basic concepts applied to other domains of social and
cultural life. The semiotician is attempting to grasp the system
(langue) which underlies and makes possible meaningful events
(parole). He is concerned with the system as a functioning totality
(synchronic analysis) not with the historical provenence of its
various elements (diachronic analysis), and he must describe two
kinds of relations: contrasts or oppositions between signs
(paradigmatic relations) and possibilities of combination through
which signs create larger units (syntagmatic relations).
Peirce is a very different case. A wayward philosophical
genius, denied tenure by Johns Hopkins, he devoted himself
wholeheartedly to «semeiotic,» as he called it, which would be the
science of sciences, since «the entire universe is perfused with signs
if it is not composed entirely of signs)? If the universe consists entirely of signs (and he argued that even man was a sign-not the
word man but man as category or individual), then there is a great
deal of classifying to do. Peirce's voluminous writings on semiotics
remained unpublished and unreadable until recently. Only with the
growth of semiotics in the last few years have our levels of tolerance
risen to the point where we can read Peirce, but it is still difficult,
since the laboriously produced Collected Papers did not recognize
semiotics as a field of enquiry and disrupted by their arrangement
Peirce's attempts to constitute it through his writing. The failings
of this edition have doubtless confirmed many in the view that
«who steals my Peirce steals trash.» His revaluation will not be accomplished until the new, semiotically-oriented edition of his
works appears.
Peirce's writings are full of proliferating categories (in arguing
that men are like other signs he cited the fact that both men and
signs procreate): distinctions combine to produce such species as
«rhematic indexical sinsign.» There are, he decided, ten
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol6/iss1/2
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trichotomies by which signs can be distinguished, giving us 59,049
classes of sign. Fortunately, there are redundancies and dependencies so that one only need deal with 66 categories, but even this has
proved too much for all but the most masochistic theorists, and this
excessive or impractical character of Peirce's ambitious constructions has prevented him from exercizing the influence he might
have. Today, it is becoming increasingly evident that he is a radical
theorist of the first magnitude.
Peirce is a philosophical pragmatist. He defines truth not as
correspondence with some objective reality but as what works: to
call a judgement objectively valid is to predict that eventually «all
the world will agree in it.»5 Reality is what is presented in the opinion which will prevail. Peirce shows, in an argument worthy of
Nietzsche or Derrida, that «external reality» is something we
postulate in order to account for our conviction that investigation
will lead to agreement. The reality of things is the postulate we
make in order to explain our belief that people will, after discussion
and investigation of alternatives, when all the evidence is in, reach
agreement. We account for this conviction by assuming that there
is an independent, external reality that will induce agreement.
«This involves,» Peirce says, «no error, and is convenient for certain purposes, but it does not follow that it affords the point of
view from which it is proper to look at the matter in order to
understand its true philosophy. o'
Those who do not know Peirce well and simply cite him to buttress an argument sometimes assume that since he is known as a
pragmatist he must be above all a practical man, a believer in brute
facts, suitable guru for a practical American semiotics which would
repudiate the excessive theorizing of Europeans, especially the
French. On the contrary, Peirce, much more than Saussure, is the
brilliant, speculative theorist, delighted to pursue ideas wherever
they may take him. Deciding that the answer to the question «what
is man?» is that he is a symbol or sign, Peirce works towards a
more specific answer by asking in what respects a man differs from
the word six (this is a fascinating lecture in which, incidentally, he
concludes that the differences are primarily physiological).'
Peirce and Saussure are very different (at sixes and sevens, one
might say) but recent theoretical work, such as Umberto Eco's
Theory of Semiotics and the papers by Sebeok and Eco in the 1975
Peirce symposium, has shown that their teachings are congruent or
complementary on a surprising number of matters.' Indeed, a major achievement of recent semiotic theory is to have made it imPublished by New Prairie Press
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possible to oppose Peirce to Saussure in a simplistic way. As
Thomas Sebeok, doyen of American semioticians, has noted, «the
distinction between the traditions has lost its force.»' Occasionally
someone still will appeal to one parent against the other, as children
trying to get away with something will do, but usually this can be
shown to rest on a misunderstanding of Peirce: that he is practical
while Saussure is theoretical. There are at least four important
points on which the approaches of these two founders of semiotics
meet and form a tradition. The first two points are not directly
related to the study of literature but the last two are.
1. The first point is presented by Peirce's claim that «the entire universe is perfused with signs if it is not composed entirely of
signs.»'° Since the late nineteenth century, a series of eminent
thinkers has insisted that our world be discussed in terms not of
physical objects and events but of social and cultural facts: objects
and events with meaning, which is to say, signs. Philosophers,
sociologists, psychologists have shown that even the most elementary processes of perception themselves are already semiotic, involving social and cultural matrices, categories, distinctions. It has
become almost banal truth that there is no perception, in the sense
of unmediated presence of objects: the perceptual object is already
a sign. We perceive an example of a chair.
Semiotics can take no credit for these discoveries about the
symbolic nature of all human experience, which have been made in
other fields. Semiotics is the systematic culmination of this perspective. As Peirce says, it is not that we have objects on the one hand
and thoughts on the other; it is, rather, that we have signs
everywhere, «some more mental and spontaneous, others more
material and regular.»" The task of semiotics is to describe the
various systems of signs and sign processes which make up the
world and, in particular, to study the ways in which semiotic
systems and activities create the cultural units which are the objects
of our world.
Here the basic semiotic principle is what Saussure called the arbitrary nature of the sign. Occasionally people think this means only that the signifiers of forms used to express concepts are arbitrary: determined by convention rather than by any natural affinity between form and concept. To restrict the principle in this way
is to fall into an error which Saussure frequently warned against,
the error of thinking of a language as a nomenclature which supplies its own names or forms to denote concepts or classes given in
advance. Students and teachers of languages are, of course, only
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol6/iss1/2
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too aware that each language has not only its own system of
signifiers but also its own system of signifieds, its own concepts.
Languages articulate the world in different ways, which is why
translation cannot be undertaken by looking up each foreign word
in a dictionary and writing down the English word which stands for
the same concepts-it doesn't work because the concepts are never
quite the same. Each language articulates a system of signifieds
which are, in Saussure's terms, arbitrary and conventional: arbitrary because not determined by an independent reality (French
and English are equally valid articulations of the world); conventional because however natural they seem they are always determined by social rule, semiotic convention. This is the fundamental
principle of semiotics.
It is perhaps worth adding here that the principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign should not be confused with the so-called
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that language determines thought. On the
contrary, semiotics insists that there is a whole range of cultural activities and practices-not just language-semiotic in nature, which
create categories that will find a place as signifieds in natural
languages. Thus the rules of basketball create categories which
English then names as «dunk-shot» or «foul.» Clearly it is not the
case that because «foul» is a sign of English there will be fouls in
basketball. The rules of the game are a semiotic sub-system which interacts with the language. For semiotics, we live among a series of
systems of this kind which articulate a world. What we think of as
things or events are semiotic constructs, cultural units.
2. I have already broached the second point which defines the
heritage of Peirce and Saussure and which bears on the relation of
verbal signs to non-verbal signs. Peirce, in one of his ten
trichotomies, distinguished symbols (which were purely conventional and best represented by linguistic signs) from indices (where
signifier is related to signified by causality or contiguity) and icons
(where there is a relation of resemblance). Saussure too noted that
there were different sorts of signs, but he argued that however
natural the relationship between signifier and signified may appear
in non-verbal signs, there is always a convention which semiotics
must investigate." Semiotics must always resist the tendency
among members of a culture to take their signs as natural, as based
on a non-conventional relation. Recent work on Peirce's concept of
the icon by Sebeok and Eco has shown how much Peirce agreed
with Saussure: " whether we are dealing with maps, paintings or
diagrams, every material image «is largely conventional in its mode
Published by New Prairie Press
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of representation.»" It is only after taking for granted a great
many complicated conventions that one can suggest that a map actually resembles what it represents. The task of semiotics is to uncover these conventions on which our everyday activities depend.
The principle of the arbitrary and conventional nature of all signs is
the guarantee against sloppiness and delusion.
I have said that these two points did not relate directly to the
study of literature, but they do confirm something which students
of literature already know to be the case. If a poem tells us that the
beloved wore a silver gown, we do not think that this sequence
simply represents an extra-linguistic reality which has determined
the sequence. We know that what is represented here is itself part of
a sign system, so we ask what this means and how it fits in with the
rest of the poem. In literature we are free from the delusion that
signs are determined (and accounted for) by realities which are
simply there prior to any semiosis. Semiotics is a codification of
this understanding of sign systems which literary critics, for the
most part, already have.
3. The third point on which Peirce and Saussure would agree
is that semiotics is not a method of interpretation which can be applied to a text to produce new readings. It is, rather, a theoretical
framework within which the study of signifying processes of all
kinds takes place. It asks not «what does this work mean?» but
«how is the process of signification organized here?» It is important to note, though, that rigorous attention to the signifying procedures that a work establishes and to the work's own representation of the signifying process can yield subtle and penetrating interpretations of literary works. This kind of criticism, which involves
a scrupulous analysis or taking apart of the logic of signification in
a text, is now often called «deconstruction.»
4. Finally, by posing the problem of what kind of sign processes are at work in texts, semiotics ought to have one very important consequence: it ought to make criticism confront a problem
which it has always tried to sweep under the rug, the problem of the
relationship between signification and communication.
This is a central issue in semiotics. Those who see semiotics as
studying communication are content to think of meaning as what is
communicated by signs, and this view has its virtues in some cases.
We are not likely to object to the notion that a word's meaning is
what it means to speakers of the language, but those who want
semiotics to deal, as Peirce did, with all kinds of correlations
among semiotic phenomena, find that the attempt to treat meaning
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol6/iss1/2
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as what is communicated does not suffice in practice. As soon as we
look at actual texts or situations we begin to make discoveries, to
see relationships and correlations which had not previously been

noticed and which have not therefore been communicating
anything to anyone. If one were to study the behavior of
undergraduates-highly codified and ritualized, always communicating to those in the know-we might discover, for example,
that the fad of «streaking» coincided with the Watergate
cover -up." Whatever we think of this correlation, it seems wrong
to reject it on the grounds that this meaning was not communicated
to spectators at the time. When we come to literature, the critic certainly will not be content to reject a pattern or correlation he has
just discovered on the ground that it has not been communicating
meaning to previous readers. On the contrary, literary criticism as a
semiotic activity has been predicated on the attempt to discover and
interpret new patterns, structures, and correlations.
However, criticism has usually tried to avoid facing this
semiotic problem. The New Criticism, by identifying the intentional and affective fallacies, simply denied the relevance of a communicational perspective and assumed that literature involved
signification which was inherent in the structures of the work and
which patient study might discover. Recent ventures into what has
come to be called «reader-response criticism,» whether
sophisticated as in Stanley Fish or bathetic as in versions based on
ego psychology, simply reverse the claim: there is no signification,
no meaning to be discovered. Meaning is simply the experience of
each reader, what is communicated to him. This is not only false to
literary criticism, which has been able to make discoveries about
meaning that have become part of our knowledge of literature, but
also false to the classroom situation on which it claims to focus.
What we find in a classroom, when you give a class a poem, is not
25 students projecting their unique personalities onto works and
each producing a complex interpretation which precisely reflects his
personality, but rather varying degrees of incomprehension, interpretations carried over from previous classes, etc.-until discussion
begins; patterns, structures, and correlations are pointed out; and
students begin to make discoveries about meaning and come to see
interpretive possibilities which their teachers had not envisioned.
That we are dealing with complex structures and an interpretive
competence becomes clear in the work of Stanley Fish. Though
Fish says he is recording the experience of an informed reader like
himself, that is improbable, for any real reader, as he started on his
Published by New Prairie Press
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14th «self-consuming artifact,» would not have the experience Fish
describes-the experience of being surprised and disturbed to see

the work question its own categories and negate its own claims. '6
On the contrary, he would expect this and be pleasantly gratified to
see his expectations confirmed. What Fish presents as meaning
communicated is in fact significance discovered.
Semiotics, with its focus on the problem of meaning, ought to
make critics aware of the necessity of working out a dialectic between signification and communication, constructing a theory that
accounts for the possibility of discovering meaning, instead of
either rejecting the communicational perspective or else arguing
that criticism has been an elitist activity which ought to stop studying works and simply record what they mean to those who have not
yet learned to read carefully and skillfully.
So far I have proceeded without examples, except for that bare
reference to streaking, and to put some clothes on this naked form I
should like to conclude with some remarks about a work well
known to most readers, a work which our culture has interpreted as
central to our definition of the nature and situation of man:
Oedipus Rex. Freud, one of millions of enthusiastic readers,
describes the play as follows:
The action of the play consists of nothing other than the process of revealing, with cunning delays and ever-mounting excitement (a process that can be likened to the work of a
psychoanalysis) that Oedipus himself is the murderer of
Laius, but further that he is the son of the murdered man and
of Jocasta. Appalled at the abomination he has unwittingly
perpetrated, Oedipus blinds himself and forsakes his home. '7

Freud emphasizes that the play involves the bringing to light, the
revelation, of an awful deed-the event par excellence-and this
event is so powerful that it imposes its meaning (Oedipus is «appalled»), irrespective of any intention by the actor. This is what has
always been communicated by the play: the event is revealed; it
makes Oedipus guilty; and he attains true human dignity in accepting the meaning imposed by the revealed event.
But this reading fails to account for an interesting element in
the play, discussed in a different perspective by Sandor Goodhart. "
When Oedipus first asks whether anyone witnessed Laius's death
he is told, «All died save one who fled in terror and could tell us only one clear fact. He said that robbers, not one but many, fell in
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with the King's party and killed them.» And later, when Oedipus
begins to wonder whether he may in fact have killed Laius, he tells
Jocasta that all hangs on the testimony of this witness, whom they
await. «You say he spoke of robbers, that robbers killed him. If he
still says robbers, it was not I. One is not the same as many; but if
he speaks of one lone traveller, there is no escape: the finger points
to me.» To which Jocasta answers, «Oh, but I assure you, that was
what he said. He cannot go back on it now; the whole town heard
it, not only I.»
The only witness has publicly told a story that is incompatible
with Oedipus's guilt. This possibility of innocence is never effectively eliminated, for by the time the witness arrives Oedipus is busy
discovering that he is the son of Laius and asks only about his
birth, not about the murder. The witness is never asked whether the
murderers were one or many.
I am not suggesting that Oedipus was really innocent and has
been falsely convicted for 2400 years. I am interested in the
significance of the fact that the possibility of innocence is never
properly dispelled: the whole action of this play is the revelation of
the dastardly deed, but we are never confronted with the deed
itself, given the testimony of the eyewitness. Oedipus himself and
all his readers are convinced that he is guilty, but our conviction
does not come from revelation of the deed. Where does it come
from? From a repetition of prophecies, from signs. It was prophesied that Laius would be killed by his son; it was prophesied
that Oedipus would kill his father; and Tiresias, asked who is guilty
of murder, prophesies that it will prove to be Oedipus. Given this
conjunction of signs, this textual interweaving of prophecies, when
Oedipus discovers that he is the son of Laius he leaps to the conclusion that he is the murderer.
He becomes the murderer of his father not by a violent act that
is brought to light but by deeming the act to have taken place: by
assuming that what the signs claim must have happened, by appropriating what the signs represent. The network of signs which
the prophecies have woven leads to the affirmation of the event
which those signs predict. And we as readers cannot escape this
process either: the text compels us to affirm the truth of the parricide.
I offer this beginning of a reading of Oedipus to support my
claim that literary criticism must not limit itself to what has been
communicated but must preserve the possibility of discovering
meaning by reinterpreting elements previously disregarded. But
Published by New Prairie Press
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from a semiotic point of view what is important here is the play's
implicit commentary on the relation between meaning and event,
between signs and the «realities» often thought to be independent
of them. On the one hand, in working toward revelation of the
murder, the play implicitly claims that the revealed event will determine meaning. If it took place, then Oedipus is a parricide; and the
play compels readers to affirm, with Oedipus, that because it did,
he is. But the play also shows that this deed is not revealed as such
but inferred from signs. We are given not a deed from which we infer meaning but meaning from which we infer a deed. Peirce identified «external reality» as what is inferred from our belief in agreement, and we find much the same position here. We are not wrong
to think Oedipus is guilty, but it can be shown that the event which
we take as imposing is already a consequence of signs and not a
reality independent of semiosis. In the beginning was the word. We
are not wrong to think that there are events, that they create meaning, but whenever we try to grasp a thing or event said to have
determined meaning, we discover that the thing or event is already
a product of signs, already enmeshed in semiosis. We cannot get
outside textuality.
What I offer here is not a semiotic reading of Oedipus-there
is no such thing- but a reading attentive to the logic of signification and in that sense a reading made possible by semiotics. Here as
elsewhere, one consequence of semiotics is the demonstration that
events, the originary events which we always seek to discover, are
themselves already semiotic consequences.
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